

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-15 MCT-01 ACDA-10 /103 W

----- 018002

P R 062135Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7691

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

E.O.11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR IS XF

SUBJ: RABIN INTERVIEW (CONTINUED)

REF: PARIS 35824

1. A RESUME OF THE SECOND (AND LAST) INSTALLMENT OF RABIN'S INTERVIEW BY WINKLER, PRINTED IN "FRANCE SOIR" OF DEC 6-7, FOLLOWS. ACCORDING TO "FRANCE SOIR", THE INTERVIEW WAS IN LATE NOVEMBER, BUT A RELIABLE ISRAELI JOURNALIST PUTS IT ON NOV 10.

2. (IF EGYPT AND SYRIA REFUSE TO GO TO GENEVA WITHOUT THE PLO, AN IMPASSE) WOULD DOUBTLESSLY BE CREATED. BUT THIS EVENTUALITY IS FORESEEN IN A MEMORANDUM SIGNED AT THE TIME OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT IN SEPT 1975 BY KISSINGER AND ALLON. THE US GOVERNMENT DECLARED IN THIS DOCUMENT THAT ITS POLICY IS NOT TO NEOGITATE WITH THE PLO AND NOT TO URGE ISRAEL TO DO SO

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UNTIL THE PLO HAS RECONGIZED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO

EXISTENCE AND ACCEPTED UNSC RESES 242 AND 338. THAT YEAR THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO CONVENE A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE. AT THAT TIME, THE US REMAINED FAITHFUL TO ITS ATTITUDE AND SO STATED PUBLICLY. BUT NEITHER THE USSR, NOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES, NOR THE PLO WERE READY TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS STIPULATED BY THE AMERICANS. THE RUSSIANS IN SENDING INVITATIONS TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

3. THE ISRAELI POSITION IS NOT (THAT THE PLO COULD BE INVITED WERE IT TO RECOGNIZE ISRAELIS RIGHT TO EXISTENCE). THAT IS THE AMERICAN POSITION AS EXPRESSED IN THE MEMORANDUM. AS FOR OURSELVES, WE SPECIFIED IN THAT DOCUMENT THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO.

4. (IN THIS CASE), A PROBLEM THAT COULD ARISE ONCE WE WERE AT GENEVA (IS THAT THE US MIGHT JOIN THE USSR IN INVITING WHOMEVER THEY WISHED TO GENEVA). WE KNOW THAT THERE IS NOW A DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON THIS POINT BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES. BUT IT IS A BIT HYPOTHETICAL. FOR THE MOMENT, THE PLO HAS NOT ACCEPTED EVEN THE AMERICAN VIEWPOINT.

5. IF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE RECONVENES, THE MAIN PROBLEM WILL NOT BE THAT OF TERRITORIES, BUT OF PEACE. WHAT SORT OF PEACE ARE THE ARABS READY TO CONCLUDE? WHAT WILL BE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN, ISRAELI, JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN PEOPLE? THE FIRST QUESTION THAT SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED IS WHAT WILL BE THE NATURE OF THE PEACE TO BE NEGOTIATED. WITHOUT HAVING THAT FIXED, WE WOULD NOT EVEN KNOW WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT. ONCE AGREED ON THE DEFINITION OF PEACE, AND ONLY THEN, WE CAN DISCUSS OTHER PROBLEMS: FRONTIERS, THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES, STAGES FOR IMPLEMENTING OUR ACCORD, ETC.

6. FOR THE ARABS, PEACE IS SIMPLY THE END OF THE STATE OF WAR. FOR ME, IT IS FIRST, OF COURSE, THE END OF

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THE STATE OF WAR. THEN, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS INVOLVING THE OPENING OF BORDERS TO PERSONS AND GOODS. EVERY ISRAELI SHOULD BE ABLE TO TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS AS EVERY SYRIAN COULD COME TO HAIFA. THIRD, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC AND CULTURAL REATIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, WHEN APPROACHING THIS POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, SADAT SAYS TROUBLING THINGS. WHAT WE CALL PEACE, HE SEES AS A DISTANT

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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OBJECTIVE WHICH HE CALLS "NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS".

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO KNOW WHAT REALITIES WILL
EXIST IN THE REGION, WHAT KIND OF REALTIONS THE ARAB
AND ISRAELI PEOPLES WILL HAVE. NOW, ARABS AND
ISRAELIS HAVE TOTALLY DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE MATTER.

7. (EVEN THOUGH WE THINK A COMMON MARKET IS NOW
HARDLY POSSIBLE TO REALIZE), EVEN WITHOUT A FORMAL
AGREEMENT, EVEN IF THE STATE OF WAR CONTINUES
OFFICIALLY, WE ARE PERFECTLY READY TO UNDERTAKE
ECONOMIC PROJECTS OF MUTUAL VALUE WITH OUR NEIGHBORS.
WE ARE READY TO APPROACH EVERY ASPECT OF ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, EVEN WITHOUT A POLITICAL ACCORD, IF OUR
NEIGHBORS ARE SO DISPOSED. IT IS SOMETIMES BETTER TO
BEGIN BY UNDERTAKING COMMON ECONOMIC PROJECTS AND,
THANKS TO THE BENEFITS FLOWING FROM THEM, CREATE AN
ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD ACCELERATE THE MARCH TOWARD

PEACE, THAN TO WAIT FOR THE DIPLOMATS TO CONCLUDE AN
AGREEMENT BEFORE ATTACKING ECONOMIC PROJECTS. I WOULD
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BE READY TO APPROACH THESE QUESTIONS EVEN BEFORE GOING
TO GENEVA, OR OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK.

8. THE JERUSALEM QUESTION OUGHT TO BE SETTLED IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF A GENERAL ACCORD. WHEN WE ARE READY TO
SIGN A PEACE TREATY AFTER HAVING SATISFACTORILY
SETTLED THE SENSE OF THE WORD PEACE, WE CAN THEN
ENVISAGE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. ON THE GOLAN, I
DON'T THINK WE CAN DESCEND FROM THE PLATEAU,
BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN WE MUST HOLD TO THE PRESENT LINE.
WE ARE ALSO READY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE SINAI,
BUT WE CAN NOT RETURN TO THE OLD INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER.
WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR CONTROL OF SHARM-EL-SHEIKH AND
HAVE LAND LIAISON WITH IT. THIS IS ENTIRELY FOR
SECURITY REASONS.

9. JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN A UNITED CITY AND THE CAPITAL
OF ISRAEL; THUS IT MUST BE WITHIN ISRAEL.
ISRAEL MUST, OF COURSE, ACCORD TOTAL LIBERTY OF ACCESS
TO THE HOLY PLACES TO THE FAITHFUL OF ALL RELIGIONS,
AS IT HAS DONE SINCE 1967. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF
CREATING AN ENCLAVE ENJOYING EXTRATERRITORIALITY;
JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN ONE AND INDIVISABLE.

10. THE REAL PROBLEM IS NOT (THAT DIFFERENT MEMBERS
OF THE CABINET HAVE EXPRESSED DIFFERENT VIEWS ON BORDER
PROBLEMS). THE THREE PARTIES FORMING THE GOVERNMENT
AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NEGOTIATE A DRAFT
AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN. ALTHOUGH THIS PROJECT
ENVISAGED TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN THE WEST BANK, IT
COULD NOT BE TRANSFORMED INTO A FINAL TREATY BEFORE THE
COUNTRY HAD BEEN CONSULTED. GENERAL ELECTIONS MUST
TAKE PLACE AND EACH CANDIDATE MUST INDICATE IN HIS
PROGRAM WHETHER HE THINKS THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED
SOLUTION SHOULD BE APPROVED. THUS WE WOULD BE ASSURED
THAT ON A QUESTION OF CAPITAL IMPORTANCE, THERE WOULD
BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE, ITS REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE GOVERNMENT. WE DO NOT HAVE THE POWER NOW TO
DECIDE HOW FAR WE CAN GO. IT SHOULD ALSO NOT BE
FORGOTTEN THAT THE RABAT SUMMIT WITHDREW JORDAN'S RIGHT
TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL ON THE WEST BANK. IT IS NOT
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THE WESTERN POWERS BUT THE ARABS WHO HAVE PREVENTED HUSSEIN FROM ADOPTING A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE. IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS OBLIGE US TO MOVE PERMANENTLY INSTALLED VILLAGES.

11. I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT I KNOW WHAT SARKIS' POSITION (ON SOUTHERN LEBANON) IS. I EXPECT HIM -- WITH THE AID OF LEBANESE FORCES IN THE SOUTH AND OF OTHER FACTORS IN THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF LEBANON -- TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT LEBANON FROM BECOMING A BASE FOR TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL.

12. EUROPE IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, IN OUR EYES. WE HAVE ALL KINDS OF TRADITIONAL RELATIONS AND WANT TO REENFORCE THEM. ISRAEL IS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ARMS DELIVERIES TO ANY ARAB COUNTRY IN A STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL. THIS PARTICULARLY CONCERNS PLANS FOR DEVELOPING A MILITARY AND AIR INDUSTRY IN ARAB COUNTRIES. I AM NOT SURE THAT THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE FRENCH ATTITUDE (AS A RESULT OF RECENT FRENCH VOTES ON ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS IN THE UN), BUT WERE THERE TO BE ONE, WE WOULD WELCOME IT.
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